The Impact of Past Epidemics on Future Disease Dynamics by Bansal, Shweta & Meyers, Lauren Ancel
The Impact of Past Epidemics on Future
Disease Dynamics
Shweta Bansal∗†‡, Lauren Ancel Meyers§¶
November 18, 2018
Abstract
Many pathogens spread primarily via direct contact between infected
and susceptible hosts. Thus, the patterns of contacts or contact network
of a population fundamentally shapes the course of epidemics. While
there is a robust and growing theory for the dynamics of single epidemics
in networks, we know little about the impacts of network structure on
long term epidemic or endemic transmission. For seasonal diseases like
influenza, pathogens repeatedly return to populations with complex and
changing patterns of susceptibility and immunity acquired through prior
infection. Here, we develop two mathematical approaches for modeling
consecutive seasonal outbreaks of a partially-immunizing infection in a
population with contact heterogeneity. Using methods from percolation
theory we consider both leaky immunity, where all previously infected
individuals gain partial immunity, and perfect immunity, where a fraction
of previously infected individuals are fully immune. By restructuring the
epidemiologically active portion of their host population, such diseases
limit the potential of future outbreaks. We speculate that these dynamics
can result in evolutionary pressure to increase infectiousness.
1 Introduction
Immunity acquired via infection gives an individual protection from subsequent
infection by the same or similar pathogen for some period of time. For diseases
such as measles, varicella (chickenpox), mumps and rubella, complete immu-
nity lasts a lifetime; therefore an individual who has been infected by one of
these pathogens, once recovered, cannot be reinfected, nor transmit the infec-
tion again. For other diseases, immunity wanes with time, leaving previously
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infected individuals only partially protected against reinfection (called partial
immunity). This degradation of immunity may be caused by antigenic variation
in the circulating pathogen or loss of antibodies over time. The transition from
complete to partial immunity can happen over different timescales: over a few
weeks as with norovirus and rotavirus [41], over months or a few years as with
influenza [20], or over many years as with pertussis [38]. Here, we present new
methods for modeling the epidemiological consequences of partial immunity.
Although partial immunity is not well-understood, there is evidence that
partial immunity functions in one of two ways: leaky or perfect. For a de-
gree of partial immunity q, leaky partial immunity implies that each immunized
individual reduces their chances of getting reinfected and infecting others by
a proportion q, whereas perfect partial immunity implies that a fraction q of
immunized individuals enjoy full protection from reinfection and the remain-
ing (1− q) proportion are completely susceptible. Leaky partial immunity is
expected to be the more common of the two, and more consistent with our
understanding of the immune system [22]. Perfect partial immunity is less com-
mon, but can occur if some individuals are unable to mount a lasting immune
response to an otherwise fully immunizing disease. It has been observed, for
example, in vaccine and animal studies for varicella, meningococcal infection
[12], and Hepatitis C [10, 15].
Partial immunity may impact the host in multiple ways, and have far-
reaching implications for the transmission of a disease through a population.
Specifically, it can decrease one or both of two fundamental epidemiological
quantities: infectivity, the probability that an infected individual will infect a
susceptible individual with whom he or she has contact; and susceptibility, the
probability that a susceptible individual will be infected if exposed to disease
via contact with an infected individual. In mathematical models, the probabil-
ity of transmission (transmissibility) during a contact between an infected and
susceptible individual is often represented as a product of the infectivity of the
infected node and the susceptibility of the susceptible node. Partial immunity
can limit transmissibility either by lowering the probability of reinfection or re-
ducing the degree to which an infected individual sheds the pathogen. Both, for
example, occur in the case of influenza [36, 13].
Mathematical modeling of infectious disease dynamics has been dominated
by the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) compartmental model [23] which
considers infectious disease transmission in a closed population of individuals
who enjoy complete immunity following infection. The SIR model has been ex-
tended to Susceptible-Infected-Recovered-Susceptible (SIRS) dynamics to model
the full loss of complete immunity after a temporary period of protection [21, 39],
and has been applied successfully in several situations (e.g. [19]). Models of
partially immunizing pathogens are less common, and have primarily been de-
veloped for particular pathogens, such as influenza [34, 24, 29]. They con-
sider the impacts of antigenic variation and the resulting complex patterns of
cross-immunity on epidemic dynamics, but are limited by the assumptions of
homogeneous-mixing.
Contact network epidemiology is a tractable and powerful mathematical ap-
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proach that goes beyond homogeneous-mixing and explicitly captures the di-
verse patterns of interactions that underlie disease transmission [5, 40, 31, 25,
35, 4]. In this framework, the host population is represented by a network of
individuals (each represented by a node) and the disease-causing contacts (rep-
resented by edges) between them (Figure 1(a)). The number of contacts (edges)
of a node is called its degree, and the distribution of degrees throughout the net-
work fundamentally influences where and when a disease will spread [25, 27, 4].
The traditional SIR model has been mapped to a bond percolation process on a
contact network, in which individuals independently progress through S, I, and
R stages if and when disease reaches their location in the network [27]. The
bond percolation threshold corresponds to the epidemic threshold, above which
an epidemic outbreak is possible (i.e. one that infects a non-zero fraction of the
population, in the limit of large populations); and the size of the percolating
cluster (or giant component) above this transition corresponds to the size of
the epidemic. The standard bond percolation model for disease spread through
a network, however, assumes a completely naive population without immunity
from prior epidemics [27].
In this paper, we extend the bond percolation framework to consider the
impact of infection-acquired immunity on epidemiological dynamics. We model
both perfect (Section 2.1) and leaky (Section 2.2) partial immunity, and show
that the two models are identical in the cases of no immunity or complete im-
munity, but make very different predictions for partial immunity. The evolution
of infectiousness, virulence and a pathogen's antigenic characteristics are in part
driven by the epidemiological environment. Although significant attention has
been paid to the interaction between contact network structure and pathogen
evolution and competition [8, 33, 37, 9, 28], we do not yet understand the inter-
seasonal interactions via modification to the immunological structure of the host
contact network. Feedback from an evolving organism to its own ecological and
evolutionary environment is generally known as niche construction [30, 7]. Here,
we use our models to explore a particular instance of niche construction: the
impacts of prior epidemics on the future dynamics of the pathogen.
2 Methods: Incorporating Infection-Acquired Im-
munity into a Network Model
We present two mathematical approaches to modeling partial immunity. First,
we model perfect partial immunity by completely removing a fraction of the in-
dividuals (their nodes and edges) who are infected during an epidemic (Figure
1(b)) from the network.Using the bond percolation model, we then derive epi-
demiological quantities for a subsequent outbreak in the immunized population.
Second, we model leaky partial immunity using a new two-type percolation
model. The underlying contact network topology remains intact, but nodes
are classified either as partially immune or susceptible (Figure 1(c)). In both
models, we assume that both infectivity and susceptibility are reduced due to
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immunity, but the leaky partial immunity model can be easily adapted to model
other effects of immunity.
Below, we use both models to consider dynamics in three network types: (a)
Poisson, with degree distribution pk = e−λλk/k!; (b) exponential, with degree
distribution pk = (1 − eκ)e−κ(k−1); and (c) scale-free, with degree distribution
pk = k−γ/ζ(γ), each with a mean degree of 10. All model predictions are
verified using stochastic simulations which assume a simple percolation process
with parameters to match the model.
2.1 Perfect Partial Immunity
Perfect partial immunity, sometimes known as all-or-nothing partial immu-
nity or polarized immunity, implies that for a partial immunity level (1− α), a
fraction (1− α) of the infected population are fully immune to reinfection (and
thus transmitting to others) and the remaining proportion α are fully vulnera-
ble to reinfection (and transmission to others thereafter.) In terms of a contact
network, this means that a fraction of the previously infected nodes are now
completely removed (along with its edges) from the contact network and are no
longer a part of the transmission process. The residual network, introduced in
[16, 3] models this phenomenon. Previously, we characterized the residual net-
work as the network made up of uninfected individuals and the edges connecting
them, as we assumed that all infected individuals had gained full immunity to
infection and thus could be fully removed (along with their edges) from the
transmission chain of future epidemics. Now, we extend the description of the
residual network to include not only uninfected nodes, but also nodes that were
previously infected but have already lost immunity. We apply bond percolation
methods to this extended residual network to model the spread of a subsequent
outbreak in a population that has already suffered an initial outbreak.
The simple Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered (SIR) bond percolation model
allows us to derive fundamental epidemiological quantities based on the aver-
age transmissibility T of the pathogen (that is, the average probability that an
infected node will transmit to a susceptible contact sometime during its infec-
tious period) and the degree distribution of the host contact network, denoted
{pk} where pk is the fraction of nodes with degree k [27]. This assumes that
the probabilities of transmission from infected nodes to susceptible nodes are iid
random variables. We can then calculate the epidemic threshold for a given net-
work (Tc), above which a large scale epidemic is possible; this is closely related
to the traditional epidemiological quantity, R0. We can also find the probability
and expected size of an epidemic above that threshold as well as the probability
that an individual at the end of a randomly chosen edge (contact) does not
become infected during an epidemic (u) [27]. We will apply this method to
calculate epidemic quantities for two consecutive seasons, and use subscripts 1
and 2 to denote initial and subsequent outbreak, respectively. Specifically, T1
and T2 denote the average transmissibilities of the pathogen in each season, re-
spectively, and allow for evolution of infectiousness from one season to the next;
p1(k) and p2(k) denote the fraction of nodes with k susceptible contacts prior
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to the first and second seasons, respectively; and u1 and u2 denote the fraction
of contacts that remain uninfected following the each outbreak.
The probability that an individual of degree k will remain uninfected after
the first epidemic can be calculated as (1− T1 + T1u1)k [25]. We denote this
probability η1(k). We next derive the degree distribution of the epidemiologi-
cally active portion of the network following the initial outbreak. This includes
both nodes that were not infected and nodes that were infected and subsequently
lost immunity, as well as all edges connecting them. The fraction of active nodes
with k active edges just prior to the second outbreak is given by
p2 (k) =
puninfected2 (k) + αp
infected
2 (k)∑
j
p1(j)η1(j) + α
∑
j
p1(j) (1− η1(j)) (1)
where puninfected2 (k) and p
infected
2 (k) are the fractions of susceptible nodes with
k susceptible neighbors among previously uninfected and infected nodes, respec-
tively and α is the proportion of infected individuals who have lost immunity
prior to the second outbreak. The denominator of Equation 1 gives the propor-
tion of the network that is susceptible prior to the second outbreak, where the
first term considers previously uninfected nodes, and the second term gives the
proportion α of previously infected nodes.
The probability that a node in the residual network has k remaining edges
(i.e. edges that connect them to other susceptible nodes), given that it had κ
edges in the initial network is the following:
p2(k|kinit = κ) =
(
κ
k
)
(u1 + (1− u1)α)κ ((1− u1)(1− α))κ−k
For every node in the residual network, remaining edges include (a) those that
lead to nodes that were uninfected in the previous epidemic (which occurs with
probability u1[3]) and (b) those that lead to nodes that were infected but have
lost immunity (which occurs with probability (1− u1)α). Then the degree
distribution prior to season two can thus be rewritten as,
p2 (k) =
∑
κ≥k
p1(κ)η1(κ)p2 (k|kinit = κ) + α
∑
κ≥k
p1(κ) (1− η1(κ)) p2 (k|kinit = κ)∑
j
p1(j)η1(j) + α
∑
j
p1(j) (1− η1(j))
We provide the full derivation of this equation in the Supplementary Informa-
tion.
The residual degree distribution {p2(k)} reflects the epidemiologically active
portion of the population following the initial epidemic. Although the residual
network differs from the original contact network in degree distribution, com-
ponent structure and other topological characteristics, it is still reasonable to
model it as a semi-random graph (as shown in [3]) and thus apply bond perco-
lation methods [27]. Additionally, we show in Supplementary Information that
both immunity models also perform well on non-random realistic or empirical
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networks. We next derive epidemiological quantities that predict the fate of a
subsequent outbreak through the residual network.
The probability generating function (PGF) for the second season degree
distribution in terms of the PGF for the initial degree distribution, Γ1 (x) is
given by
Γ2(x) =
Γ1 (r (x (1− s) + s)) + αΓ1 ((1− r) (x (1− s) + s))
Γ1 (r) + α (1− Γ1 (r)) .
where r = (1− T1 + T1u1) is the probability that disease was not transmitted
along a uniform random edge in the first epidemic; and s = (1− u1) (1− α) is
the probability that a node at the end of a uniform random edge was infected
gained full immunity.
This allows us to derive the epidemic threshold for the subsequent outbreak,
that is, the critical value of transmissibility above which a second epidemic is
possible, given that some previously infected individuals have perfect immunity.
It is a function of the original network topology (via the PGF Γ1 (x)) and the
loss of immunity, α, and is given by
(T 2c)perfect =
Γ2′(1)
Γ2′′(1) =
Γ′1(r)r(1−s)+αΓ′1(1−r)(1−r)(1−s)
Γ′′1 (r)r
2(1−s)2+αΓ′′1 (1−r)(1−r)2(1−s)2
where Γ′1 (r) ,Γ
′
1 (1− r) are the average degrees among previously uninfected
nodes and infected nodes, respectively. If the second strain is above this epi-
demic threshold, then the following equation gives the expected fraction of the
residual population infected during the resulting epidemic
S2 = 1− Γ2 (u2)
where u2 is the probability that a random edge in the residual network leads
to a node which was uninfected in the second outbreak. (See Supplementary
Information.) Thus the overall fraction expected to become infected during a
second epidemic, assuming perfect partial immunity at a level (1− α) is given
by
(S2)perfect = S2
(∑
k
p1(k)η1(k) + α
(
1−
∑
k
p1(k)η1(k)
))
where
∑
pkηk represents the size of the population which was uninfected in the
previous outbreak and α (1−∑ pkηk) is the proportion of the population that
was infected in the previous outbreak but has lost immunity.
2.2 Leaky Partial Immunity
To model leaky partial immunity, we reduce the probabilities of reinfection
and transmission for nodes infected in the first epidemic. Rather than deleting
nodes and attached edges entirely (as above), we introduce a two-type percola-
tion approach in which the parameters of disease transmission depend on the
epidemiological history of both nodes involved in any contact.
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2.2.1 Two-type Percolation
The standard bond percolation model of [27] assumes that, all nodes of a given
degree k are homogeneous with respect to disease susceptibility and all edges
are homogeneous (probabilities of transmission along edges are i.i.d. random
variables with mean T ). We extend the basic model to allow for two types of
nodes, we call them A and B; and four types of edges, AA, AB, BA, BB,
connecting all combinations of nodes. (A similar model was recently introduced
in [1].) We use pij to denote the joint probability that a uniform random type
A node has i edges leading to other type A nodes and j edges leading to type
B nodes (where i the A-degree of the node and j the B-degree of the node).
Similarly, qij denotes the joint probability of a type B node having an A-degree
of i and a B-degree of j. The multivariate probability generating functions
(PGFs) for these probability distributions are given by
fA(x, y) =
∑
pijx
iyj
fB(x, y) =
∑
qijx
iyj
While fA and fB describe the distribution of degrees of randomly chosen A
and B nodes, the degree of a node reached by following a randomly chosen edge
is measured by the its excess degree [27]. The PGFs for the A-excess degree and
the B-excess degree of A and B nodes are given by
fAA(x, y) =
∑
ipijx
i−1yj∑
iqij
fBA(x, y) =
∑
jpijx
iyj−1∑
jqij
fAB(x, y) =
∑
iqijx
i−1yj∑
iqij
fBB(x, y) =
∑
jqijx
iyj−1∑
jqij
as illustrated in Figure 2.
Having formalized the structure of the contact network in PGFs, we can now
derive the distributions for the number of infected edges, which are edges over
which disease has been successfully transmitted. We assume that for each edge
type (XY ), transmission probabilities are i.i.d. random variables with averages
denoted TXY , and that these values can vary among the four edge types. Then
the PGFs for the number of occupied edges emanating from a node of type A
and B are, respectively:
fA(x, y;TAA, TAB) = fA((1 + (x− 1)TAA), (1 + (y − 1)TAB)
fB(x, y;TBA, TBB) = fB((1 + (x− 1)TBA), (1 + (y − 1)TBB)
Each of these generating functions was derived following the arguments out-
lined in [27] for the simple bond percolation SIR model. We can similarly derive
the PGFs for the number of infected excess edges emanating from a node of type
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A (B), at which we arrived by following a uniform random edge from a node of
type A (B):
fAA(x, y;TAA, TAB) = fAA((1 + (x− 1)TAA), (1 + (y − 1)TAB))
fBA(x, y;TAA, TAB) = fBA((1 + (x− 1)TAA), (1 + (y − 1)TAB))
fAB(x, y;TBA, TBB) = fAB((1 + (x− 1)TBA), (1 + (y − 1)TBB))
fBB(x, y;TBA, TBB) = fBB((1 + (x− 1)TBA), (1 + (y − 1)TBB))
The PGFs for outbreak sizes starting from a node of type A or B, respec-
tively, are then given by
FA(x, y;TAA, TAB) = xfA(FAA(x, y; {T}), FAB(x, y; {T});TAA, TAB)
FB(x, y;TBA, TBB) = yfB(FBA(x, y; {T}), FBB(x, y; {T});TBA, TBB)
where, FAA and FBA are the PGFs for the outbreak size distribution starting
from an (infected) node of type A which has been reached by following an edge
from another (infected) node of type A or B, respectively. Similarly, FAB and
FBB are the PGFs for the outbreak size distribution starting from an (infected)
node of type B which has been reached by following an edge from another
(infected) node of type A or B, respectively. These PGFs are as follows
FAA(x, y; {T}) = xfAA(FAA(x, y; {T}), FAB(x, y; {T});TAA, TAB)
FBA(x, y; {T}) = xfBA(FBA(x, y; {T}), FBB(x, y; {T});TAA, TAB)
FAB(x, y; {T}) = yfAB(FBA(x, y; {T}), FBB(x, y; {T});TBA, TBB)
FBB(x, y; {T}) = yfBB(FBA(x, y; {T}), FBB(x, y; {T});TBA, TBB)
Again following the method of [27], we can derive the expected size of a small
outbreak and the epidemic threshold (given in the Supplementary Information).
The expected numbers of A and B nodes infected in a small outbreak are found
by taking partial derivatives of the PGF for the outbreak size distribution:
〈s〉A =
∂FA
∂x
|x=1,y=1 + ∂FB
∂x
|x=1,y=1
〈s〉B =
∂FA
∂y
|x=1,y=1 + ∂FB
∂y
|x=1,y=1
Finally, we can find the size of a large-scale epidemic among A nodes and
among B nodes as:
SA (TAA, TAB) = 1−FA(1, 1;TAA, TAB) = 1−
∑
pij(1+(a−1)TAA)i(1+(c−1)TAB)j
(2)
SB (TBA, TBB) = 1−FBB(1, 1;TBA, TBB) = 1−
∑
qij(1+(b−1)TBA)i(1+(d−1)TBB)j
(3)
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where, a = FAA(1, 1; {T}), b = FBA(1, 1; {T}), c = FAB(1, 1; {T}), d =
FBB(1, 1; {T}). The probability of a large-scale epidemic can be derived sim-
ilarly. The numerical values for the size and probability of an outbreak will
be equal if TAB = TBA. Further details are provided in the Supplementary
Information.
This two-type percolation model provides a general framework for modeling
pathogens with variable transmissibility and host populations with immunolog-
ical heterogeneity.
2.2.2 Modeling Leaky Immunity with Two-Type Percolation
We now apply the two-type percolation method to model leaky partial immu-
nity. In this model, type A nodes represent individuals who were not infected in
the initial epidemic and thus have no prior immunity, and type B nodes repre-
sent those who were infected and maintain partial immunity (at a level 1− α).
(Note that α gives the fraction of immunity lost in both models.) Here, we as-
sume that prior immunity causes equal sized reductions in both infectivity and
susceptibility (α); but the approach can be extended easily to include more com-
plex models of immunity. Specifically, during the subsequent epidemic, type A
individuals (previously uninfected) have a susceptibility of one and an infectiv-
ity of T2,while type B individuals (previously infected) have a susceptibility of α
and an infectivity of T2α. Correspondingly, TAA = T2, TAB = T2α, TBA = T2α,
and TBB = T2α2 .
The joint degree distributions for type A and type B nodes depend on the
course of the initial epidemic, and are given by
pij = p1(i+ j)η1(i+ j)
(
i+ j
i
)
ui1 (1− u1)j
qij = p1(i+ j) (1− η1(i+ j))
(
i+ j
i
)
ui1 (1− u1)j
respectively, where i is the A-degree and j is the B-degree. Further expla-
nation can be found in Supplementary Information.
Using the quantities derived above, we can model epidemics that leave vary-
ing levels of individual-level partial immunity. Using equations 2 and 3, for
example, we can solve for the size of the epidemic in a second epidemic with
(individual-level) leaky partial immunity, (1− α):
(S2)leaky =
(∑
k
p1(k)η1(k)
)
SA (T2, T2α)+
(
1−
∑
k
p1(k)η1(k)
)
SB
(
T2α, T2α
2
)
.
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3 Results
3.1 Impact of One Epidemic on the Next
We have introduced two distinct mathematical approaches for modeling the
epidemiological consequences of naturally-acquired immunity. The residual net-
work model probabilistically removes nodes and edges corresponding to the
fraction (α) of infected nodes expected to lose immunity entirely. The two-
type percolation model tracks the epidemiological history of all individuals and
reduces the infectivity and susceptibility of all previously infected nodes by a
fraction (α). By adjusting α, both models can explore the entire range of im-
munity from none to complete. At α = 1 , these model the absence or complete
loss of immunity and thus would apply when the second season strain is entirely
antigenically distinct from the prior strain. At α = 0, these model full or no
loss of prior immunity and might apply when a secondary epidemic is caused
by the same or very similar pathogen as caused the first epidemic. Values of α
between 0 and 1 represent partial immunity to the second pathogen, with the
level of protection increasing as α approaches 0.
In Figure 3, we compare the predicted sizes of a second epidemic for both
the perfect and leaky models against simulations for a Poisson, exponential and
scale-free random network (of the same mean degree) and under the conditions
of no prior immunity (α = 1), partial immunity (α = 0.5), and full immunity
(α = 0) for values of transmissibility between 0 and 0.5 . There is a strong
congruence between our analytical calculations and their corresponding simu-
lations. Assuming no immunity (Figure 3(a)), the two models simplify to the
standard bond percolation model on the original network, and thus make iden-
tical predictions. Assuming full immunity (Figure 3(c)), the perfect immunity
model removes all previously infected nodes (and the corresponding edges) be-
fore the second outbreak; and the leaky immunity model sets transmissibility
along all edges leading from and to previously infected nodes to zero, thus de-
activating those nodes entirely. Consequently, the models also converge at this
extreme. The two models are, however, fundamentally different for any level
of intermediate partial immunity between (0 < α < 1) as they assume different
models of immunological protection (Figure 3(b)). At α = 0.5, leaky immunity
confers greater herd immunity than perfect immunity at low values of transmis-
sibility, while the reverse is true for more infectious pathogens. The makeup
of the previously infected population is identical in both models and biased to-
wards high degree individuals. When the pathogen is only mildly contagious,
leaky immunity goes a long way towards protecting all previously infected hosts
whereas perfect immunity protects only a fraction of these hosts; when it is
more highly contagious, however, leaky immunity is insufficient to protect hosts
with large numbers of contacts whereas perfect immunity is not diminished. We
find further that network heterogeneity acts consistently across different levels
of immunity. The Poisson network has the most homogeneous degree distribu-
tion followed by the exponential network and finally the scale-free network with
considerable heterogeneity. Holding mean degree constant, variance in degree
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increases the vulnerability of the population (allowing epidemics to occur at
lower rates of transmissibility), yet generally reduces the ultimate size of epi-
demics when they occur. At high levels of immunity, the susceptible network
at the start of the second season becomes more sparse and homogeneous. Thus
the impact of network variance on the second epidemic diminishes as immu-
nity increases, that is, as α → 0. (We elaborate further on these results in the
Supplementary Information.)
We explore intermediate levels of immunity further in Figure 4, and again
find reasonable agreement between our analytic predictions and simulations. As
expected, increasing levels of immunity (from left to right) decrease the epidemic
potential of a second outbreak.At these intermediate values of transmissibility
(T1 = 0.15 and T2 = 0.3), leaky immunity tends to confer lower herd immunity
than perfect immunity, except at extremely high levels of immunity. The level
of immunity at which the predicted epidemic sizes for two immunity models
cross represents the point at which leaky partial immunity for all prior cases
effectively protects more individuals than the complete removal of a fraction of
those cases. This transition point occurs at a higher level of immunity in the
exponential network than the Poisson network, and never occurs in the scale-free
network, perhaps because the immunized individuals in the more heterogeneous
networks tend to have anomalously high numbers of contacts thus limiting the
efficacy of partial protection.
3.2 Pathogen Re-invasion and Immune Escape
When a pathogen enters a population that has experienced a prior outbreak, its
success will depend on the extent and pattern of naturally-acquired immunity
in the host population. The new pathogen may not be able to invade unless it
is significantly different from the original strain. If it is antigenically distinct
from the prior strain, then prior immunity may be irrelevant; and if it is more
transmissible than the original strain, then it may have the potential to reach
previously unexposed individuals.
Figure 5 indicates the minimum transmissibility required for the new strain
to cause an epidemic (that is, its critical transmissibility T2c), as a function of
the transmissibility of the original strain (T1) and the level of leaky immunity
(α). The leakier the immunity (high α) and the lower the infectiousness of the
original strain (low T1), the more vulnerable the population to a second epidemic
(light coloration in Figure 5). Generally the homogeneous Poisson network is
less vulnerable to re-invasion than the heterogeneous scale-free network. The
blue curves in figure 5 show combinations of T1 and α where the epidemic
threshold for the new strain equals the transmissibility of the original strain
(T2c = T1) and have two complementary interpretations. First, if we assume
that the new strain is exactly as transmissible as the original strain (T = T2 =
T1), then the curves indicate the critical level of cross-immunity (αc(T )) below
which the strain can never invade and above which the strain can invade with
some probability that increases with α. This threshold indicates the extent
of antigenic evolution (or intrinsic decay in immune response) required for a
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second epidemic to occur. The more heterogeneous the contact patterns (scale-
free versus Poisson network), the lower the amount of immune escape required
for a pathogen of the same transmissibility to re-invade. Second, if we assume
a fixed level of immune decay (α), then the curves indicate the critical initial
transmissibility (T1) above which the new strain can only invade if it is more
contagious than the original strain (T2 > T1). Below this point, the network
topology and preexisting immunity create a selective environment that excludes
the original strain and favors more transmissible variants. The perfect immunity
model yields similar results (Supplementary Information.)
Some epidemiologists have speculated that there are 'trade-offs' between
virulence and infectiousness, implying that more infectious pathogens will nec-
essarily be more virulent [2, 14, 11, 17]. If true, figure 5 suggests that naturally-
acquired immunity, by opening niches for more infectious variants, may in-
directly lead to the evolution of greater virulence. This is consistent with a
previous study showing that that host populations with high levels of immunity
maintain more virulent pathogens than naï¾÷ve host populations [18].
4 Discussion & Conclusion
In this work, we have considered the impact of pathogen spread on future out-
breaks of the same or similar pathogen and on pathogen invasion and evolution.
We have compared two standard models for immunity, perfect and leaky, and
found that the extent of herd immunity varies with the pathogen transmissibil-
ity and the degree and nature of immunity. Leaky immunity appears to confer
greater herd immunity at moderate levels of pathogen infectiousness for all lev-
els of partial immunity, whereas perfect immunity is more effective at higher
transmissibilities.
This analysis also has implications for public health intervention strategies.
Contact-reducing interventions (e.g., patient quarantine and social distancing)
and vaccination often result in complete removal of a fraction of individuals
from the network (akin to perfect immunity), whereas transmission-reducing
interventions (e.g., face-masks and other hygienic precautions) typically reduce
transmissibility along edges leading to and from a fraction of individuals (akin
to leaky immunity) [32]. These results thus suggest that contact reductions will
be more effective than a comparable degree of transmission reductions at higher
levels of pathogen infectiousness.
The evolution of new antigenic characteristics in a pathogen that escape prior
immunity and the evolution of higher transmissibility both depend on genetic
variation. Thus, the more infections there are in the first season, the greater the
opportunity for evolutionary change [6]. This poses a trade-off for the pathogen:
a large initial epidemic may generate variation that fuels evolution yet wipes out
the susceptible pool for the subsequent season; while a small initial outbreak
leaves a large fraction of the network susceptible to future transmission yet
may fail to generate sufficient antigenic or other variation for future adaptation.
We have shown that the trade-off between generating immunity via infections
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and escaping immunity via antigenic drift will depend not only on the size
of the susceptible population, but also on its connectivity. Although we have
focused primarily on the role of antigenic drift, these models also apply to loss of
immunity through decay in immunological memory, as occurs following pertussis
and measles infections [26, 38].
Much epidemiological work, particularly the analysis of intervention strate-
gies, ignores the immunological history of the host population. Thus our effort to
incorporate host immune history into a flexible individual-based network model
will potentially advance our understanding of the epidemiological and evolution-
ary dynamics of partially-immunizing infections such as influenza, pertussis, or
rotavirus. However, these provide just an initial step in this direction, as the
models consider only two consecutive seasons and do not yet allow for replen-
ishment or depletion of susceptibles due to births and deaths.
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  Residual Contact Network
Leaky Partial ImmunityPerfect Partial Immunity
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(c)(b)
Figure 1: Epidemiological contact networks. (a) Prior to an initial epidemic, all
individuals are fully susceptible to disease (gray nodes). Then some individuals
become infected during the epidemic (red nodes). (b) Perfect partial immunity
(at 50%) means that half of the previously infected individuals are fully pro-
tected against reinfection, while the other half are fully susceptible again. (c)
Leaky partial immunity (at 50%) means that all nodes remain in the network,
but the edges leading to and/or from previously infected individuals are half as
likely to transmit disease (illustrated here with the lighter edges.)
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Figure 2: The probability generating functions give the numbers of A and B
contacts for each type of vertex (top). The four excess degree distributions give
the numbers of each type of contact for a vertex chosen by following a uniform
random edge (bottom).
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Figure 3: Expected size of a second epidemic as infectiousness increases. We
compare the predictions of our mathematical models for perfect (dashed line)
and leaky (solid line) immunity to corresponding numerical simulations (crosses
and circles indicate perfect and leaky immunity, respectively). Calculations are
for three types of networks: Poisson (red), exponential (blue), and power law
(green) with mean degree 10, for three levels of immunity: (a) no immunity
(α = 1), (b) partial immunity (α = 0.5), and (c) full immunity (α = 0), and for
a range of second strain transmissibility values (T2) along each x-axis (assuming
T1 = 0.15 in all cases).
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Figure 4: Expected size of a second epidemic as immunity increases. We com-
pare predictions of the perfect immunity model (gray dashed lines), leaky im-
munity model (black solid lines) and simulations for each model (gray cross and
black circle markers, respectively). Calculations and simulations are for net-
works with (a) Poisson, (b) exponential, and (c) scale-free degree distributions
with mean degree 10, at transmissibilities T1 = 0.15 and T2 = 0.3.
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Figure 5: Epidemic threshold (T2c) in the second season. The colors indicate
the level of transmissibility required for the second strain to invade the popu-
lation (cause an epidemic), assuming leaky partial immunity for (a) a Poisson-
distributed network and (b) a scale-free network, each with mean degree of 10.
The x-axis gives the first season transmissibility (T1) and y-axis gives the loss
of immunity (α). The blue line denotes T2c = T1,: above the line T2c < T1, and
invasion by the original pathogen is possible.
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